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Results  of object-in-context  experiments  can be inﬂuenced  by  relative  recency.
Data  from  two  experiments  presented  supporting  this  suggestion.
This  may  complicate  interpretation  of  results  of object-in-context  experiments.
Recommendations  are made  on how  to address  this.
Results  consistent  with  an  associative  account  of recognition  memory.
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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In two  experiments  rats  received  training  on  an  object-in-context  (OIC)  task,  in which  they received
preexposure  to object  A  in  context  x,  followed  by exposure  to object  B  in  context  y. In  a subsequent
test  both  A and  B  are  presented  in  either  context  x or context  y.  Usually  more  exploration  is seen  of
the  object  that has  not  previously  been  paired  with the  test context,  an effect  attributed  to the ability
to  remember  where  an  object  was  encountered.  However,  in  the  typical  version  of this  task,  object  A
has also  been  encountered  less  recently  than  object  B  at test. This  is precisely  the  arrangement  in tests
of  ‘relatively  recency’  (RR),  in  which  more  remotely  presented  objects  are  explored  more  than  objectsiscrimination
bject recognition
avlovian conditioning
riming
ecognition memory
experienced  more  recently.  RR  could  contaminate  performance  on  the  OIC task,  by  enhancing  the OIC
effect  when  animals  are  tested  in  context  y, and  masking  it when  the  test  is  in  context  x. This  possibility
was  examined  in  two  experiments,  and evidence  for superior  performance  in context  y was  obtained.
The  implications  of this  for  theoretical  interpretations  of  recognition  memory  and  the  procedures  used
to  explore  it are  discussed.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).. IntroductionThe phenomenon of spontaneous object recognition (SOR)—the
bservation that animals show a preference for exploring a novel
bject rather than one that has been previously encountered
Abbreviations: OIC, object-in-context; RR, relative recency; SOR, spontaneous
bject recognition.
∗ Corresponding authors. Tel.: +44 115 9515218; fax: +44 115 9515324.
E-mail addresses: eric.tam@ndcn.ox.ac.uk (S.K.E. Tam),
harlotte.bonardi@nottingham.ac.uk (C. Bonardi),
asper.robinson@nottingham.ac.uk (J. Robinson).
URLs: http://www.eye.ox.ac.uk/team/research-scientists/shu-tam (S.K.E. Tam),
ttp://www.nottingham.ac.uk/psychology/people/charlotte.bonardi (C. Bonardi),
ttp://jasperrobinson.wordpress.com (J. Robinson).
1 Now at: Nufﬁeld Laboratory of Ophthalmology, University of Oxford, Level 5–6
est Wing, John Radcliffe Hospital, Headley Way, Oxford OX3 9DU, United Kingdom.
el.: +44 7854596500
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2014.12.024
166-4328/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u[1–3]—underlies a variety of tasks designed to examine memory
processes in rats and mice. One version of this, the object-in-
context (OIC) task, is used to assess rodents’ ability to remember
where they have encountered a speciﬁc object. In one typical vari-
ant of this task the rodent is allowed ﬁrst to freely explore one type
of object, A, in one context, x, and subsequently a different type of
object, B, in another context, y (see Fig. 1). Each context-object pair-
ing usually consists of a single trial. After a delay, a test with objects
A and B is given in one or other of the two contexts. It is typically
reported that normal animals show a preference for the object that
has not been encountered in the test context [4–12]. It has been pro-
posed that this task relates to the ‘where’ component of episodic
memory (e.g., [11,12]), context memory (e.g., [6]), recollection (e.g.,
[8]) or, more generally, contextual processing [7,9,10].Another variant of the SOR procedure, the relative recency (RR)
task, is designed to evaluate learning about when an object was
experienced, by examining the animal’s ability to discriminate
objects based on how long ago they have been encountered. Here
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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Fig. 1. Design of Experiment 1 and example of speciﬁc objects and contexts presented in the sample phases of an OIC recognition trial. A rat is allowed to freely explore one
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eype  of object (A) in one visual context (x), and subsequently, a different type of ob
iven  a choice between A and B, either in the less recent context x, or in the more r
t  the time of test, the memory trace of object A would be relatively weaker than th
he rat is allowed to freely explore one type of object, A, and subse-
uently a different type of object, B, in the same apparatus. After a
elay, the animal receives a test with the objects A and B presented
imultaneously [13–18]. Animals show a preference for object A,
he object that has been encountered earlier in the series. Rel-
tive recency has been described as a form of temporal memory
n which events are remembered in sequence through a higher-
rder mnemonic function (e.g., [13,14]). This description implies that
he mechanism underlying RR is likely to be quite distinct from
hat responsible for OIC learning—indeed the learning mechanisms
nvolved in the OIC and RR versions of the task are regarded as
ndependent [19].
The suggestion that RR and OIC tasks rely on independent mech-
nisms has, however, been challenged. For example, the most
bvious analysis of SOR (e.g., [1–3]) is that exposure to object A
eaves a memory trace that is present during the test, but absent
or the new object, B [18,20–23]. Performance on RR tasks can be
xplained in similar terms, by arguing that the preference for the
ess recent A stems from its memory trace being weaker than that
f the more recent B. Moreover, as the delay between the sample
rials and testing increases, the difference in preference between
 and B declines [18]. This may  be understood by assuming that
he difference in the trace strength of A and B is greatest at short
elays when A’s memory trace has had an opportunity to decay but
’s remains active; as the delay increases, the memory traces for
oth objects will eventually decline to some negligible value (for
iscussion see, e.g., [23,24]). For ease of exposition, we describe
he decline in memory performance over time as ‘decay’ though we
cknowledge here that it might be the result of a more active pro-
ess of interference (see, e.g., [25]). That is, the memory trace of the
arget stimulus may  be supplanted by the accumulated memory
races of interfering stimuli that are present during the retention
nterval. Interfering stimuli may  be explicitly added by the experi-
enter (see, e.g., [25,26]) but even when they are not, non-speciﬁc
vents in the laboratory may  create the same effect (see, e.g., [27]).
An alternative, but related, analysis of SOR maintains that appa-
atus cues enter into an excitatory association with the pre-exposed
—the process assumed to underlie Pavlovian conditioning. At test,
he excitatory association activates the memory of the pre-exposed
bject, reducing the degree to which it is explored. In contrast the
ovel B, not being associated with the apparatus cues, is unexpected
n that apparatus; thus its memory is not activated and normal
xploration is maintained (e.g., [20,28–30]). The same explanation) in a different visual context (y). Following these two sample phases animals are
context y. Note that object A has been encountered earlier than object B, and thus,
bject B.
can be used to explain OIC learning: Although both objects will
become associated with their respective contexts, only the mem-
ory of the object that has been previously encountered in the test
context will be subject to this associative activation, and this is why
it is explored less than the alternative object.
This view assumes that while RR depends on differential decay
of the memory trace (cf. [15–17]), OIC stems from differences in
associative activation of the memory trace [18,20–23,28–30], and
both processes may  contribute to SOR performance. This analy-
sis of performance on both OIC and RR tasks in terms of the same
underlying mechanism raises the possibility that they might inter-
act. For example, in the OIC procedure originally described by Dix
and Aggleton [5], animals received two exposures to each of the
objects, A and B, in their respective contexts in a double alterna-
tion procedure (A, B, B, A); however in most OIC reports animals
received only one preexposure to each of A and B [4,6–8,11,12,31].
This arrangement is problematic, because it renders interpretation
of performance ambiguous (cf. [7,12]). For example, consider the
case where A is pre-exposed in context x, and then B in context
y (Fig. 1). When recognition is tested in the ﬁrst, less recent con-
text, x, the presence of x should result in a preference for object B
because it has never been presented in x. But on the basis of rel-
ative recency one would anticipate the opposite—a preference for
object A, because it has been encountered earlier in the series. As
a result, the two processes would counteract each other when the
test is conducted in the ﬁrst context. In contrast, when recogni-
tion is tested in the second, more recent context, y, the context
would lead to a preference for object A, which is the same object
that would be preferred on the basis of relative recency. Thus here
both processes would lead to a preference for object A. This would
predict that OIC recognition should appear stronger when the test
is conducted in y—the second and more recent context—than in x.
The preceding analysis does not deny the reality of the OIC
effect; but it does suggest that, especially in this one-sample-
trial variant, OIC performance can in part be attributed to the
mechanism underlying RR. Moreover, although this suggestion is
consistent with the proposal that both RR and OIC can be explained
in terms of the same underlying mechanism, it does not require it:
Provided one accepts the existence of both OIC and RR effects, the
possibility that both might operate in the same task remains. This
in turn implies that deﬁcits in OIC performance produced by neural
manipulations are ambiguous (e.g., [6–12,31])—a neural manipu-
lation that affects OIC performance may  indeed be the result of a
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hange in learning about an object’s location, but it could also be
he result of a reduced relative recency effect in the subgroup tested
n context y.
These arguments rest on the prediction that in the task vari-
nt described above, OIC performance is superior in context y than
n context x. We  were unable to evaluate this prediction on the
asis of published work [4,6–12,31]; accordingly in the present
rticle we describe the ﬁndings from our own OIC experiments
hich, although performed for different scientiﬁc reasons, allow
omparison of performance in contexts x and y at test.
. Experiment 1
Two groups of rats were trained in this version of the OIC task,
eceiving a single preexposure of object A in context x followed by a
ingle preexposure of object B in context y. There followed a test in
hich animals were presented with objects A and B simultaneously,
ith animals in Group x being tested in context x, and those in
roup y being tested in context y (Fig. 1). As outlined above, we
redicted that for Group x, RR and OIC processes should counteract
ach other, resulting in a weaker difference in exploration between
 and B than in Group y, for whom RR and OIC should both tend to
roduce more exploration of A than of B.
.1. Method
.1.1. Subjects
The subjects were 12 male, Lister hooded rats (Rattus norvegi-
us; Charles Rivers, UK), housed in pairs in acrylic cages held in
n air-conditioned vivarium, which was illuminated between 0700
nd 1900. The cages contained fresh woodchip bedding, and a
arge cardboard cylinder to provide environmental enrichment;
ater and food were freely available. All the rats had previously
erved in a Skinner-box experiment, but were naive to the appara-
us and stimuli described here. The experiment was conducted in
wo replications (n = 8 and n = 4 respectively; equal numbers within
ach replication were assigned to Groups x and y). At the start
f the study rats in Replication 1 were approximately 350 g, and
hose in Replication 2 approximately 500 g. Two of the four rats
n Replication 2 received small intra-peritoneal injections of phys-
ological saline before each of the trials described below, which
based on work from our laboratory) was known not to inﬂuence
ehaviour; one of these rats was allocated to each experimen-
al group. The procedures reported here constituted part of two,
arger-scale experiments which included treatment groups that are
ot relevant to our current concerns and whose data are thus not
onsidered here.
.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Four rectangular arenas with walls and ﬂoors of white translu-
ent plastic (length × width × height: 60 cm × 40 cm × 45 cm),
ocated in a quiet, brightly lit room, were used simultaneously.
 camera was suspended 90.0 cm above the centre of each arena
rom a frame. Each camera’s view (approximately 45◦ arc) included
he complete ﬂoor but only the lower part of the four walls. Each
amera was ﬂanked by two LED spotlights, 22 cm apart, which
roduced a ﬂoor-level illumination of 50 lx; these were switched
n at the start of each phase and off when the phase ended.
ny-maze software (version 4.5; Stoelting, Wood Dale, IL) was
sed to track each rat’s head location in two-dimensional space
n the plane of the apparatus ﬂoor. The software was calibrated
o detect a black region-of-interest (i.e., each rat’s head) against white background. The software created two notional circular
bject zones of 15-cm diameter, which surrounded each object’s
ase; these zones were located along the horizontal midline of
he apparatus, and the short walls were tangents to the zones;Research 281 (2015) 250–257
the centres of the circular zones were 30 cm apart. Rats’ head
location in the two  zones was  timed continuously, which allowed
the creation of a cumulative record of zone entry.
Multiple copies of three objects served as stimuli: (a) a blue,
plastic bottle (20.0 cm in height with a circular base of 7.0 cm diam-
eter); (b) a moulded plastic bottle covered with black and white
penguins (20.5 cm in height with maximum base dimensions of
9.0 cm × 10.0 cm); and (c), a cylindrical, silver aluminium vacuum
ﬂask (19.5 cm in height with a base of 7.0 cm diameter).
Wall inserts made from medium density ﬁbreboard lined with
linoleum served as the contexts; these covered the whole of one
of the shorter walls and half of both longer walls (see photographs
in Fig. 1). These inserts were 45.0 cm high and, when inside the
box, gave ﬂoor space of 42.0 cm × 32.0 cm.  Two  different patterns
were used: Mb, a mosaic of 2.3 cm2 blue squares whose edges were
45◦ from horizontal (left-hand side of Fig. 1 photograph), and Dw,
a mosaic of white 272-cm2 squares whose edges were 90◦ from
horizontal, with a black, 16-cm2 square superimposed at each point
where four white squares met  horizontal (right-hand side of Fig. 1
photograph).
2.1.3. Procedure
2.1.3.1. Apparatus pre-exposure. Each rat was exposed to the arena
(without objects or inserts) for three sessions, one session per day.
In each session the rat was  placed in the apparatus facing the mid-
point of the long wall and allowed to explore for 10 min. The wall
inserts and the ﬂoor of the apparatus were cleaned with diluted
alcohol after each rat’s session.
2.1.3.2. Sample trials. Each rat received two  sample trials of 10-
min  duration. In the ﬁrst the rat was allowed to explore two copies
of a novel object (A) in one context: the two  copies of A were
placed at the centres of the two object zones. Five minutes later,
rats received the second sample phase, in which they were allowed
to explore two copies of a different novel object (B), positioned in
a similar manner in the alternative context. In both replications,
half the rats in each group had context x as Mb  and context y as
Dw, and the remainder the reverse; in Replication 1 half of each of
these two  subgroups had the blue bottle as A and the penguin as
B, and the remainder the reverse; in Replication 2 objects A and B
were the penguin and either a steel ﬂask (n = 3) or the blue bottle
(n = 1).
2.1.3.3. Test trials. The test trial occurred approximately 5 min
after the ﬁnal sample trial. Rats in Group x were tested in
context x (the ﬁrst-sampled context) and rats in Group y in con-
text y. These trials were identical to the sample trials except
that animals were presented simultaneously with one copy of
A and one of B. For approximately half the rats in each group,
A was on the left and B on the right, and for the remainder
the reverse. Data were recorded for the ﬁrst two minutes of the
test.
2.1.4. Data treatment
No data were recorded during the apparatus preexposure or
sample trials. OIC recognition performance during the test was
expressed as the ratio (n − p)/(n + p), where p and n are the times
spent exploring the object that, respectively, had and had not been
paired with the test context. This measure yields ratios ranging
between +1 and −1, with +1 representing exclusive exploration of
the object that had not been presented in that context during its
sample trial (the expected OIC result) and 0 representing equiva-
lent exploration of the two  objects. Ratios were calculated for each
of the ﬁrst two  minutes of the test.
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xperiment 1. Bars show standard error of the mean.
.2. Results
The test data are summarized in Fig. 2, and indicate a stronger
IC bias in Group y than in Group x. An analysis of variance (ANOVA)
ith group and minute as factors conﬁrmed this description, yield-
ng a reliable main effect of group only, F(1, 10) = 7.7, p < .020,
SE  = .073, 2p = .436, 95% CI = [.01, .68]; neither the main effect
f minute nor the interaction was reliable, smallest p > .100, F(1,
0) = 3.2, MSE  = .022.
.3. Discussion
Our prediction was that performance would be better when
he animals were tested in context y than context x, because in
he former case RR facilitates performance while in the latter it
pposes it—and that is exactly what we observed. In contrast, Nor-
an  and Eacott [7] examined performance separately in contexts
 and y, but reported that this factor had no statistical impact on
heir results. It is not clear what could have produced this discrep-
ncy, although Norman and Eacott’s study differed in a number
f ways from Experiment 1. For example, in their experiment the
ats’ exploration of the objects was limited to 30 s in each sample
hase. This could have reduced the strength of the objects’ memory
races at test, thus reducing the contribution of RR to test perfor-
ance. Mumby  et al. [6] also report a non-signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
esting in contexts x and y, although their results numerically par-
lleled those of our Experiment 1, showing superior performance
n context y than in context x.
There are two other potential explanations for the results of
xperiment 1 that must, however, be considered before we  acceptesearch 281 (2015) 250–257 253
that RR may  occur in OIC tasks. First, the general experimental envi-
ronment may  have been less familiar to the rats during the ﬁrst
sample trial in x than during the second sample phase in y. Thus,
through processes seen in standard object recognition (e.g., [1,2]),
these differences in context familiarity might have resulted in more
exploration of x than of y. Such a bias could in turn inﬂuence explo-
ration of the objects, resulting in less exploration of object A than
of object B. A tendency for the ﬁrst-presented object to be less well
processed, rather than the fact that it was  less recent, could have
been the reason why  performance was worse in Group x than in
Group y. The second possibility is that both objects were processed
equally well in the two sample trials, but that when animals were
tested in context x, because it had been experienced longer ago than
context y, it might have elicited more competing responses, which
masked OIC performance.
Both these alternative explanations rely on the suggestion that
the two  contexts differed in their familiarity, either during pre-
exposure or at test. Such a difference is an intrinsic part of the
procedure and so cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be min-
imized. This was the purpose of Experiment 2 (Fig. 3). In this study
all rats were preexposed to both contexts before the experiment
began, and the experiment was conducted within subjects, so that
all rats received training with two sets of objects in the two con-
texts, but were tested with one set of objects in context x, and with
the other in context y. Both these factors would increase the famil-
iarity of both contexts and encourage full habituation of potential
competing exploratory behaviour. In addition, the interval between
the second sample and the test phase was extended from 5 min  to
2 h, thus minimizing differences in the relative recency of the two
contexts. Finally, we recorded exploration during the two  sample
trials, to explicitly evaluate the possibility that this could have dif-
ferentially biased exploration of the objects during the preexposure
phase.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Subjects
Fifteen Lister Hooded male rats (Harlan, Bicester, UK) were used
in the present study. They had all received sham operations of the
hippocampus; thus they were anaesthetized, scalp incized, facial
muscles retracted and a portion of the cranial bone above the hip-
pocampus removed with an electric drill. A 25-G, bevel-tip needle
was lowered to a series of sites in the hippocampus, but no neu-
rotoxin was passed. Then the scalp was sutured, and they were
allowed to recover for two  weeks before the start of behavioural
testing (full details of procedure are described in [18]), at which
time they weighed approximately 400 g. They were caged in pairs
exactly as in Experiment 1. Before the start of this study they were
tested on different versions of the SOR task, but were naive with
respect to both the contexts and the objects used in the present
study.
3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Most of the apparatus was identical to that employed in Experi-
ment 1. Different objects were used on each recognition trial; they
were made of various materials (e.g., plastic, glass, stainless steel,
and ceramic) and were of different sizes and shapes. There were two
pairs of objects in total, and multiple copies of each type of object.
The pair of objects used in the ﬁrst cycle comprised a ceramic model
duck (15 cm long and 7 cm wide and 9 cm in height) and a ﬁlled,
shaped glass bottle (with a base diameter of 7 m, and 9 cm high).
The pair of objects used in the second cycle comprised a rectangu-
lar olive oil can (with a rectangular base 10 cm × 7 cm and 17.5 cm
254 S.K.E. Tam et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 281 (2015) 250–257
n of Experiment 2.
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FFig. 3. Desig
igh), and a black glass bottle (with a base 9 cm in diameter and
2 cm high). The zones round the objects in the present experiment
ere 10 cm in radius, but otherwise arranged as in the previous
xperiment.
.1.3. Procedure
.1.3.1. Apparatus pre-exposure. Each rat was exposed to the arena
ithout any objects for four days, for two sessions per day. In one
f these two 10-min sessions, the wall inserts Mb were put in the
rena, while for the other the wall inserts Dw were used. In all other
espects these sessions were identical to those of Experiment 1.
All rats received two cycles of the following OIC procedure, one
n each of two consecutive days. Each cycle used a different pair of
bjects, but the same contexts.
.1.3.2. Sample and test trials. The sample trials were identical to
hose of Experiment 1, except that each sample phase lasted only
 min. The test trials took place two hours after the end of the
econd sample phase, but were otherwise similar to those of Exper-
ment 1. For the ﬁrst OIC sequence, 8 rats were tested in context x
nd 7 rats in context y; for the second all rats that were ﬁrst tested
n context x were now tested in context y, and vice versa. For the
rst OIC sequence half of each of these groups (ns = 4 and 3) had Mb
s the context insert in the ﬁrst sample phase and Dw in the second
ample phase; this arrangement was reversed for the remaining
ats. Half of each of these subgroups (ns = 2 and 1) had the duck
n the ﬁrst sample phase and the bottle in the second, and for the
emainder the reverse. Approximately half of each of these sub-
roups were tested with duck on the left and bottle on the right,
nd for the remainder the reverse. In the second OIC sequence the
nimals that had received Mb  as the context insert in the ﬁrst sam-
le phase and Dw in the second sample phase continued to do so,
s did the animals that had experienced the reverse. The counter-
alancing of the two new objects used in this phase, the can and
lack bottle, was identical to that in the ﬁrst sequence.
.2. Results
One aim of this experiment was to examine whether there was
ess total exploration during the ﬁrst than the second sample trial;
ccordingly exploration during the two sample trials from each of
he two test cycles was computed. Initial inspection revealed no
nﬂuence of the test sequence (test in x before test in y or vice versa),
nd so data were collapsed across this factor. The mean exploration
ime for the ﬁrst and second sample trials (with SEM in parenthe-
es) were 157.5 s (1.3 s) and 151.2 s (1.2 s) for cycle 1, and 152.0 s
1.6 s) and 160.0 s (1.5 s) for cycle 2. An ANOVA with cycle (ﬁrst and
econd) and sample trial (ﬁrst and second) as factors revealed no
eliable main effects, Fs < 1, or interaction between those variables,
(1, 14) = 1.4, p > .263, MSE  = 562.337. Thus there was no evidenceFig. 4. Mean discrimination ratios for the ﬁrst and second minutes of the test of
Experiment 2. Bars show standard error of the mean.
for greater competing responses in the ﬁrst sample trial, and thus no
reason to suppose that differential exploration of the two  contexts
had a systematic effect on exploration of the two  objects.
The test data are summarized in Fig. 4. A test context (x
versus y) × minute of test (1st and 2nd) repeated-measures ANOVA
revealed a main effect of test context, F(1, 14) = 4.6, p < .050,
MSE = .168, 2p = .250, 95% CI = [.00, .93], again showing OIC perfor-
mance to be better in context y than in context x. The main effect
of minute of test and the test context × minute of test interaction
were not reliable reliable, ps > .40.
3.3. DiscussionThe results of this experiment conﬁrm those of Experiment 1, in
showing a greater OIC effect when animals were tested in the more
recent context. Moreover, some potential alternative explanations
of the results of Experiment 1 were addressed. First, there was no
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vidence of any difference in exploration in the two  sample phases
n either cycle of testing, making it difﬁcult to argue that object A
as preferred not because it was less recent per se, but because it
ad been less effectively explored than object B, as a result of com-
eting behaviour provoked by the relatively novel environment on
he ﬁrst sample trial. Moreover, the increased experience with the
wo contexts, and the increased delay between the second sam-
le phase and the test, will have minimized the possibility that
ontext x selectively interfered with performance on test simply
ecause it had been experienced less recently. Thus the results of
hese two experiments are consistent with our prediction that RR
an inﬂuence performance in OIC tasks.
. General discussion
The present results demonstrate that in the most commonly
sed version of the OIC task (e.g., [4,6–12,31]), in which animals
eceive only one sample trial with each of the two  objects, per-
ormance was reliably better when the animals were tested in
he most recent context. We  have interpreted this as evidence
hat performance does not depend solely on the context in which
he test is conducted, but also on the RR of the two  test objects
16–18,20]—The suggestion is that, when animals are tested in
he ﬁrst of the two contexts, RR opposes the effect of the context,
hereas when they are tested in the second it exaggerates it. This
ersion of the task does not, therefore, provide a pure measure of
he ability of animals to encode the context in which a particular
bject was presented, or the effect of this on subsequent memory
erformance.
.1. Empirical implications
We  offer four recommendations to minimize the impact of RR
nd/or to examine the size of RR in OIC experiments:
.1.1. Length of retention interval
According to the analysis we have offered [18,20,28–30], exten-
ion of the interval between the ﬁnal sample trial and testing (the
etention interval) may  allow the memory traces from the sample
rials to decay to their inactive states (i.e. eliminating the source of
R). With such an arrangement, only the intended, retrieval-based
ource of test performance will occur on test (i.e. OIC learning).
he point at which decay is complete could be determined by sys-
ematic variation of the retention interval in RR experiments: In
articular, the point at which the retention interval eliminates RR
iscrimination will correspond to the point at which the sample
emories have become inactive. The effective retention interval
an then be used to accurately assess OIC learning. In the absence
f such information it would seem sufﬁcient to use 24-h retention
ntervals [9,10], which are likely to be sufﬁciently long to allow
omplete memory decay.
.1.2. Number of preexposure trials
Some modiﬁcations to the design of the OIC experiment can be
sed to reduce RR. A more complex version of the OIC procedure,
riginally employed by Dix and Aggleton [5], is less susceptible to
he potential inﬂuence of RR, because here the two  objects are pre-
xposed twice in a double alternating sequence (i.e., xA,  yB,  yB,
A for half of the rats and yB,  xA,  xA,  yB for the remainder). This
reatment ensures that the presentation order of the two objects
s matched (i.e., object A being pre-exposed in positions 1 and 4,
nd B in positions 2 and 3, each with an identical midpoint). Of
ourse whether this matching in terms of presentation order can
e translated directly into matching of memory traces is question-
ble, as we cannot safely assume that the memory trace from anesearch 281 (2015) 250–257 255
object exposed on the ﬁrst and fourth trials is equivalent to that pre-
sented on the second and third. Such inequality may  be the result
of a nonlinear decay rate—a characteristic of memory performance
(e.g., [32–34])—or from differential interference stemming from
differences in the number of intervening preexposure trials [27].
Thus even the use of double-alternating sequences does not entirely
avoid potential effects of RR. It is also notable that some researchers
may  wish to use a pair of single sample trials to model episodic
memory processes [16,31,35], although some have questioned the
logic of mapping single-trial learning onto episodic memory [36].
4.1.3. Arrangement of preexposure trials
A third variant of the OIC procedure avoids the potential inﬂu-
ence of RR by combining the two  sample pairings into a single trial.
For example, Good, Barnes, Staal, McGregor, and Honey [16] gave
rats a single sample trial in which four objects were located in the
four corners of the experimental arena. In the subsequent test, the
locations of two of the objects that were located in opposite cor-
ners were switched. We  may  assume that the switched objects may
have entered into association with the two  adjacent, un-switched
objects during the single sample trial or with extra-arena cues in
the laboratory. These associations can be thought of as analogues of
the x/y context associations in other OIC procedures; thus compar-
ison of exploration of the switched and unswitched objects gives a
measure of OIC learning.
4.1.4. Analysis of subgroups’ data
Even when used with the recommendations above, our results
demonstrate the importance of analysis of data from the counter-
balanced subgroups that receive testing in context x or context y.
The outcome of this analysis may  be that there is no evidence of the
involvement of RR in OIC (cf. [6,7]), in which case results such as
the effects of neural manipulations may  be interpreted straightfor-
wardly. However, when RR is detected during OIC, effects of neural
manipulations are ambiguous—Their sources could be, e.g., a deﬁcit
in RR, OIC, or both. For the same reasons it may also be interest-
ing for researchers to report such new analyses of their previously
published work.
4.2. Theoretical interpretation
We noted above that it is possible to explain both RR and OIC
performance in terms of a mechanism that compares the relative
strength of the memory traces of the two  test objects. Accord-
ing to this view, RR depends on differential decay of the memory
trace (cf. [15–17]), while OIC results from differences in the degree
to which it is associatively activated [18,20–23,28–30]. These
assumptions have been formally incorporated into an inﬂuential
account of associative learning termed SOP (Sometimes Opponent
Process) [21,22,37,38], and this SOP model has been used success-
fully by some authors to explain performance in object memory
tasks [18,20,28–30]—representing a challenge to the views that
performance in recognition tasks of the type described here is
independent of associative learning processes [39], or that it is
the result of more complex processes [5–14 for a recent review
see 40]. According to SOP, the presentation of stimuli (objects
or the context in which they are presented) is assumed to elicit
activity in a population of representational elements, coding for
identity of each stimulus. Initially, elements are in a primary state
of activity, which elicits relatively high levels of responding (e.g.,
approach) and which supports the formation of excitatory asso-
ciations. Elements next pass into a secondary state of activation
that does not allow excitatory associative learning, and supports
weaker approach responding. Ultimately the elements become
inactive. A crucial assumption of this model is that elements can-
not pass directly from their secondary to their primary activity
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tates. This reduces approach responding when an object is pre-
ented again after recent presentation, because a relatively large
roportion of its elements are still likely to be residing in their
econdary states of activity. But more remotely presented objects,
hose elements have entirely decayed to inactivity, will be able
o elicit stronger approach responding because their elements can
ass directly into their primary activity state. These assumptions
rovide an explanation of performance in an RR experiment: at
est a greater proportion of the less recent object’s elements will
ave become inactive, allowing them to enter the primary acti-
ation state when the object is presented at test [18,28]. Similar
ogic can offer an explanation of performance in the simple SOR
ask, as the novel object’s elements are all able to enter the pri-
ary activation state, whereas those of the familiar object are
ot.
A second critical assumption of SOP is that when two items
re associated, presentation of one will place elements of the
ther directly into the secondary activation state. This provides
n alternative analysis of SOR, by supposing that apparatus cues
nter into an excitatory association with the object during the pre-
xposure phase. At test, the apparatus cues place the elements of
he pre-exposed object into the secondary activation state, reduc-
ng the degree to which it is explored. In contrast the novel object,
eing un-associated with the apparatus cues, is not expected in
he apparatus, so its elements are inactive and can enter the pri-
ary activation state when it is presented; thus normal levels of
xploration are maintained [18,20,28–30]. OIC performance can be
xplained in a similar manner; although both objects are associ-
ted with their respective contexts, at test only the elements of
he object in its preexposure context will be associatively acti-
ated. Thus the elements of the alternative object will be more
ble to enter the primary activation state and elicit the exploration
esponse.
Thus SOP proposes that RR depends on differential decay of
he stimulus elements of the two objects, while OIC stems from
ifferences in their associative activation—and there is nothing in
he model which would preclude both processes operating in the
ame task. Thus a model of this type should easily be able to
ccommodate the results reported here—a suggestion which we
ave conﬁrmed in unpublished computer simulations. Moreover,
lthough it can explain performance on these tasks as well as other
heories of object recognition, it can also explain a great variety
f associative learning effects. This breadth, we would argue, gives
his model an edge over those whose explanatory power is limited
o object recognition memory.
. Conclusion
The results of the present experiments demonstrate that, in
he most widely used variant of the object-in-place task, relative
ecency can contribute to performance. This possibility potentially
omplicates interpretation of the results from experiments using
his procedure, and we suggest a number of recommendations to
inimize, or at least monitor, the effect of RR on OIC performance.
ur results are also consistent with an associative account of recog-
ition memory, which explains performance in SOR, RR and OIC
asks in terms of the same underlying mechanism.
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